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Abstract: The article notes that Kierkegaard’s writings on the Church
had a considerable impact on theology in the 20th century including,
not least, the theological movement sometimes referred to as ‘religion-
less’ or ‘secular’ Christianity. Like that movement, Kierkegaard prob-
lematized the very idea of a Church. However, his writings also reflect a
rejection of life in the world rather than the ‘secular’ affirmation of this-
worldliness. This can seem like a version of Neo-Gnosticism. However,
it is argued that Kierkegaard’s rejection of the world is neither to be un-
derstood in the perspective of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin
nor of Gnostic dualism but reflects a modern understanding of the
world as a unitary whole. The question then is whether such a world is
favourable to human flourishing.
Kierkegaard’s Legacy to Ecclesiology
There is room for debate as to whether Søren Kierkegaard was in any
usual sense a Protestant ‘theologian’. As we know, he never held ei-
ther an academic or an ecclesiastical position, although he did con-
sider the possibility of lecturing at the Pastoral Seminary as well as
that of retreating to a rural parish after the completion of his pseu-
donymous authorship. Furthermore, despite the fact that his books
have regularly appeared on the reading lists of theology courses, they
were not written for the purpose of servicing academic theology and
might even be read as an all-out assault on the very possibility of such
a thing. Nevertheless, it is clear that he thought and wrote from with-
in a perspective very largely determined by the heritage of the Refor-
mation, in particular by the form which that heritage took in Danish
Lutheranism. This general context was further focussed by the pow-
erful influence from the Pietist spirituality that he was exposed to
through his family’s attendance at the meeting house at Stormgade
and by his studies in the theological faculty at Copenhagen Universi-
ty. And, if his books were not written to serve the purposes of aca-
demic theology, they undoubtedly addressed issues that were of cen-
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tral concern to ecclesiastical and academic theologians of his time,
such as H. L. Martensen and, increasingly in his later years, they di-
rectly addressed the question of the Reformation heritage and its sig-
nificance for Christian life and thought. Paradoxical as it might seem
(and as was also the case with his pseudonymous works), Kierke-
gaard’s arguments would become central to 20th century theological
debates about the nature of the Church and its relation to society
and, especially, to modern society. Although repeatedly insisting that
he was ‘without authority’, that his task was merely the Socratic task
of raising the question as to the true definition of Christianity, and
that he was definitely not a reformer, Kierkegaard would come to be
cited as if he was a founding father of a new reformation. In this re-
gard, the thrust of his work would seem to suggest a resounding ‘Yes’
to Peter Widmann’s question ‘War die Reformation also eher eine
Deformation, ja, die Mutter der meisten Deformationen des Christ-
lichen in der Moderne?’ Moreover, in terms of his 20th century repu-
tation, Kierkegaard’s view was not treated as one opinion amongst
others, but acquired something like a normative status.
Albert Bärthold, one of the earliest translators of Kierkegaard into
German, could already conclude his 1884 pamphlet Was Christen-
tum Ist, with the following words: ‘Diese Darstellung folgt im we-
sentlichen S. Kierkegaard’s Ausführungen’, even though—as he ac-
knowledges—he has not specifically cited Kierkegaard in the text.
The following year, Bärthold published a further pamphlet Die
Wendung zur Wahrheit in der modernen Kulturentwicklung, prompted
by the critical reception of Was Christentum Ist in the Leipziger theol-
ogische Litteratur-Blatt. Here he makes clear that despite the tendency
of those he refers to as followers of H. L. Martensen to pass over Ki-
erkegaard in silence, it is the latter who has the greater insight and in-
deed a decisive insight into the situation of Christianity in modern
culture. This situation, he suggests, is essentially the same as in the
time when Boniface took his axe to Odin’s oak: the indifference with
which this was greeted by the Hessians merely indicated that Odin’s
religion had long since ceased to be a vital force in their lives. So to-
day: if there no longer seems to be any great controversy in the rela-
tions between Christianity and society this is because there is now a
general consensus that ‘das überlieferte Christentum paßt nicht zu
der modernen Kultur. Die leidenschaftliche Erregung im Durch-
kämpfen dieser Überzeugung ist vorbei, mit Angriffen auf das Chri-
stentum ist nicht mehr viel Ruhm zu gewinnen trotz aller Anstren-
gung, auch die Vermittlungsversuche zwischen Kultur und Christen-
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tum erregen keine Interesse mehr’.1 In this situation it is Kierkegaard
and not Martensen or Ritschl from whom authentic Christian theol-
ogy can learn most.
Bärthold, we may say, was a more or less obscure pastor (in Halber-
stadt), but within 50 years his judgment had become widely accepted
amongst theologians, especially, of course, those who were associated
with dialectical theology. The title given to one of the early antholo-
gies of Kierkegaard’s journals by another pioneering translator, Her-
man Gottsched, Das Buch des Richters (1905), is fairly indicative of
the kind of status that he was acquiring early in the 20th century (SK
had himself noted that ‘If after my death they publish my journals,
they could do so under the title: The Book of the Judge’,2 but
Gottsched is perhaps the only translator actually to have done so).
The implication is that Kierkegaard himself is no mere critic or even
(to use his own term, ‘corrective’) but the ‘judge’ whose life and work
are a judgment on the state of contemporary Christianity. This may
seem an extraordinarily conceited claim, when made by Kierkegaard
himself—but in the light of his 20th century reception it seems
merely to have been realistic.
By 1950, the British Methodist theologian H. V. Martin could
write that 
One of the outstanding features of the movement of Christian thought
during the last quarter of a century has been the remarkable interest
shown in the work of that lonely thinker of Denmark, Søren Kierke-
gaard. Though he died nearly a century ago, his influence did not spread
widely until after the First World War. Then, through the writings of
Barth and other leaders of the revolt against the prevailing Liberal The-
ology the name of Kierkegaard became known as that of possibly the
greatest force behind this new theological movement.3 
Martin is not a particularly well known figure, but that precisely un-
derlines the point as regards the status Kierkegaard had acquired by
the mid-twentieth century, i.e., that he was no longer the preserve of
specialist commentators or theological extremists but had achieved
something like normative status. Through the 1950s and 1960s,
however, this would be especially true amongst those who developed
the more radically anti-ecclesiastical implications of Barth’s early
1. Albert Bärthold, Die Wendung zur Wahrheit in der modernen Kulturentwicklung
(Gütersloh, Bertelsmann 1885), 8.
2. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (Copenhagen: Gad 2003), 335
(journal entry NB 10: 158).
3. H. V. Martin, The Wings of Faith (London: Lutterworth Press 1950), 7.
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thought and who, through a certain reading of Bonhoeffer’s prison
writings, were developing a religionless or secular Christianity. 
Kierkegaard did not perhaps entirely fit with all aspects of the secu-
lar theology agenda, but he was undoubtedly a seminal figure in its
rise and subsequent formation. Now it is clear that the development
of the relations between Church (or, more generally, religion) and so-
ciety has not followed the path predicted by the secular theologians.
Within theology itself secular theology and religionless Christianity
have more or less vanished from the scene. Yet the question as to the
significance of the secular within religion and theology has surely not
been decided once and for all, and simply to repeat the mantra that
we are now in a post-secular situation is enormously to oversimpli-
fy—a trap into which Charles Taylor for one has not fallen. The par-
ticular form that the secular Christianity of the 1960s took is, inevi-
tably, tied to cultural and other factors specific to that time, but al-
though much of its agenda is no longer directly relevant it has left
some unfinished business and poses a provocation to contemporary
theology to reflect more critically on its own place, its own responsi-
bility, and its own future in the contemporary situation. The aim of
this paper is merely to explore some aspects of Kierkegaard’s contri-
bution to such a ressourcement. The outcome will be problematic, but
that is perhaps as it should be!
Kierkegaard and Secular Theology
Let me immediately state what I see as Kierkegaard’s key contribu-
tion to secular theology in the form that it took fifty years ago. First-
ly, Kierkegaard problematized the identification of the Church as a
legitimate historic manifestation of Christianity. Of course, previous
reformers and reforming movements had problematized particular
forms of the Church, but these had normally been for the sake of re-
calling the Church to some earlier state. Now it might seem possible
to read Kierkegaard’s repeated use of the expression ‘New Testament
Christianity’ as implying just that, as if the point was to recall the his-
torically degenerated Church back to the purity of the apostolic era.
However, without denying that something like that idea is in play in
some of his writings on the Church, some of them seem to point to a
still more extreme solution: that ‘the individual’ seeking God is ulti-
mately alone with Christ and that the nature of the Christ-relation-
ship is ultimately outside all external mediation. Let me cite Bruce
Kirmmse:
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. . . Kierkegaard did not simply go back to the fourth century and reject
Constantine and the idea of a State Church. Toward the end of his life it
also becomes undeniably clear that Kierkegaard rejected ‘the notion of
the congregation’ as such … The problem began not with the 1849 con-
stitution, nor with Mynster, nor the Reformation, the Middle Ages, or
even in the fourth century, but much earlier, with the foundation of the
Church by Peter and the other apostles and the baptism of the three
thousand on the first Pentecost … 4
And Kirmmse goes on to quote a well-known passage form Kierke-
gaard’s 1854 journals entitled ‘An alarming note’, which begins
‘Those three thousand who were added to the congregation en masse
on Pentecost – isn’t there fraud here, right at the very beginning?
Ought not the apostles have been uneasy about whether it was really
right to have people become Christians by the thousands, all at
once?’.5 (This passage, incidentally, is all the more remarkable given
Kierkegaard’s frequent discussions of apostolic authority as having
been above question and as sharing in the paradoxical determinants
of the Incarnation itself: here, however, not even the apostles are
spared his critical gaze.)
The point, then, is that in his later writings on the Church, Kierke-
gaard puts the very idea of a Church as such up for question to the
extent that what he effectively asks is, simply: Does Christianity actu-
ally need a Church? And note, the crucial and distinctive element
here is Christianity. From the Enlightenment onwards there has been
a steady stream of critics attacking both the reality and the idea of the
Church or of any ‘positive’ religion that sought immunity from scru-
tiny by reason. The absurdities of theology, the machinations of
priestcraft, and the historical unreliability of the scriptures were com-
pounded in a single ensemble that was to be rejected wholesale. Al-
though a certain ethical Jesus was sometimes spared the otherwise
universal condemnation, the point was to get rid of both Christianity
and the Church. However, as Kirmmse for one goes on to make
clear, whilst Kierkegaard became radically anti-ecclesiastical, he did
so precisely for Christian reasons: ‘we must insist on the whole Kier-
kegaard, radical and uncut: Christian and anti-clerical … We must
agree with the churchly Kierkegaard interpreters about the absolute
centrality of Kierkegaard’s Christianity. And we must agree with the
freethinkers that he was, in the end, radically anti-Church’.6
4. B. Kirmmse, ‘ “But I am almost never understood ..” Or, Who Killed Søren Ki-
erkegaard’ in The Self in Society, eds. G. Pattison and S. Shakespeare (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan 1998), 187.
5. Kirmmse (1998), 187.
6. Kirmmse (1998), 190.
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This, then, is probably Kierkegaard’s most significant legacy to reli-
gionless and secular Christianity: the idea—perhaps the mere possi-
bility of envisaging—a kind of Christianity that was able to dispense
with the Church but to do so for quite different reasons and with
quite different outcomes from the transformation of Christianity and
the Church into one or other variant of a ‘merely’ human ethical
community. Ronald Gregor Smith was one of the leading British
proponents of religionless Christianity, a translator of both Bonhoef-
fer and Kierkegaard, as well as commissioning editor of the SCM
Press that was strongly associated with many of the radical theologi-
cal movements of the period after World War II—and he was clear
about the nature of Christianity. As he wrote in the Introduction to
The Last Years, a selection of Kierkegaard’s journal entries from
1853 through to 1855, ‘we face here a challenge to all the traditional
forms of “Christianity”, Protestant and Catholic and even sectarian.
For however strong the pietist influence upon Kierkegaard ... it is
neither here nor in any other specific form of the Christian tradition
that we can finally classify Kierkegaard. Rather, we have to regard his
challenge as directed against all traditional forms ... the old Reforma-
tion is over. We face now an unprecedented situation in Christen-
dom’.7
But—and this is less generally noticed—Kierkegaard also provided
the secular theologians with a new model of theological writing. Nei-
ther priest nor professor, Kierkegaard pursued the central questions
of Christian theology outside the Church and outside the academy,
simply as an author. I have already indicated that he was, of course,
theologically well-educated and the theology he was educated in was
both ecclesiastical and academic. Yet, as an author, he operated in the
market-place of what he so frequently called the ‘market-town’ of
Copenhagen, where, as he so frequently lamented, market forces did
not secure a good or widespread reception if his work and, had he
not had the support of a private income, the achievement of his au-
thorship might not have been possible. (Various studies suggest that
Kierkegaard is not entirely to be trusted in this view of things, and
whilst it is true that some of his books did have very poor sales, the
authorship was, on the whole, a profitable venture—and it was Kier-
kegaard himself who long resisted Reitzel’s urging to print a second
edition of Either/Or.) Now we may—and many commentators do—
cast a somewhat—what? envious? condescending? malicious?—smile
in the direction of S. A. K., the pampered and self-indulgent man of
7. Ronald Gregor Smith, ‘Introduction’ in Søren Kierkegaard, The Last Years: Jour-
nals 1853-55 (London: Collins, 1965), 15.
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letters absorbed in the twists and turns of his self-centred literary la-
byrinth, but we should not underestimate the importance of the
move whereby he made the subject-matter of Christian theology the
subject-matter of an authorship carried out under secular premisses.
In relation to this move, the question as to whether it was self-
financed or commercially successful is purely secondary.
In this regard, the persistent biographical interest in Kierkegaard is
not without its significance, since, as Kierkegaard himself many times
said, a religious teacher is great not so much by virtue of what he says
as with regard to what he does. Thus, Kierkegaard himself became
portrayed as the solitary hero of an absurd faith who threw himself
against the twin establishment of the Hegelian system and the
Church. Kierkegaard the man became integral to the image of Kier-
kegaard the author who, in turn, was integral to Kierkegaard the cri-
tic of Christendom.
Kierkegaard and Neo-Gnosticism
However, Kierkegaard was not an unproblematic source for the secu-
lar and religionless theologies of the 1960s. The familiar biographical
story itself gives some clues as to why this should be so, since the epi-
sode with Regine seemed to be rooted in a psycho-sexual scenario
that had become very alien to a post-Freudian generation for which
sexual fulfilment was regarded as a normal and necessary part of adult
life. Whereas Victorians might have had some sympathy for a reli-
gious conscience afflicted with anxieties about sexuality, such anxie-
ties were being increasingly seen by the 1960s as signs of pathology.
In that the ‘actions’ of Kierkegaard’s life could, in the standard hagi-
ographies, come to be condensed into ‘the broken engagement’, the
‘Corsair affair’, and the ‘Attack on Christendom’, it seems not diffi-
cult to see him as exemplifying a kind of hostility to the world that,
beginning with the rejection of sexuality, proceeds through the rejec-
tion of contemporary social values, and ends with the rejection of any
possibility of a holy community on earth. Seen in this perspective,
the attack on the Church is simply a further unfolding of the logic
implicit in the story of the broken engagement: that the love of God
is not compatible with human fulfilment in the time of this earthly
life. This is what the inclusion of the term ‘neo-Gnosticism’ in the
title of my paper points to. Of course, we do not find anything in Ki-
erkegaard corresponding to the complex and arcane hierarchies and
theogonies of Gnostic speculation, but we do seem to find a rever-
sion to a kind of denial of the body and an apparent urge to flee the
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life of this world that had at most been muted in mainstream Christi-
anity for many centuries previously.
Ronald Gregor Smith says of Kierkegaard’s life that ‘It is a tragic
story, and the tone of the last words he wrote ... is profoundly dis-
turbing ...’8 Smith refers here to the entry that, in his translation
reads 
The definition of this life is to be brought to the highest degree of dis-
gust with life. He who is brought to this point and can then hold fast, or
he whom God helps to hold fast, that it is God who has brought him to
this point – he it is who from the Christian standpoint has passed the
examination of life, and is ripe for eternity. Through a crime I came into
existence, I came into existence against God’s will. The fault, which in
one sense is not mine, even if it makes me a criminal in God’s eyes, is to
give life. The punishment fits the fault: it is to be deprived of all joy of
life, to be brought to the supreme degree of disgust with life ... And
what pleases [God] even more than the praise of angels is a man, who in
the last lap of his this life, when God is transformed as though into sheer
cruelty, and with the cruellest imaginable cruelty does everything to de-
prive him of all joy in life, a man who continues to believe that God is
love and that it is from love that God does this. Such a man becomes an
angel. And in heaven he can surely praise God’.9
This, it could be said, sounds more Schopenhauerian than Christian,
and it is perhaps not coincidental that Kierkegaard began reading
Schopenhauer in 1854, whereafter the element of all-embracing
world-pessimism becomes markedly more pronounced in his writ-
ings. As all readers of Kierkegaard know, such pessimism had many
antecedents in earlier works and earlier journal entries: however, the
tendency to dualism now seems to be reified and worldly life as such
becomes categorized as inherently and essentially opposed to God.
The connection made in this passage between biological procrea-
tion and disgust with life—pathological, in a post-Freudian perspec-
tive—is also witnessed in the published writings of the Kirkestorm it-
self where Kierkegaard’s attacks on baptism, confirmation, and mar-
riage go beyond the kind of insistence on baptism requiring responsi-
ble assent on the part of the one to be baptized.
Baptism is a decisive point. In the 7th number of The Instant, Kier-
kegaard wrote
The Christianity of “Christendom” sees that everything depends upon
establishing the maxim that one becomes a Christian as a child, that if
one is rightly to become a Christian, one must be such from infancy.
8. Kierkegaard (1965), 19.
9. Kierkegaard (1965), 367-8.
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This is the basic falsehood. If this is put through, then good-night to the
Christianity of the New Testament! Then “Christendom” has won the
game—a victory which is most fitly celebrated by a regular gorge of
meats and drinks, a wild carouse with bacchants and bacchantes (priests
and midwives) at the head of the procession.10
The mention of midwives is significant here, since it flags up that for
Kierkegaard the issue is not that an infant is unable to give informed
consent, but that Christendom conflates biological birth with Chris-
tian rebirth. Later in the same number he will say that ‘everyone that
is born is by being born a lost soul’, which might seem to coincide
with the reasoning of Augustinian Christianity that infant baptism is
needed precisely because we are each of us conceived and born in sin.
However, Kierkegaard’s point is subtly different and he immediately
goes on to make a link to Paul’s stated recommendation of the single
state: by not marrying (that is, by not procreating) we refrain from
putting a new soul in danger and we refrain from augmenting the
sufferings of Christ that are needed for rescuing souls from mortal
danger. As Kierkegaard puts it
Surely it was the least one could require of a man who was himself saved
and redeemed at so dear a price that it was accomplished by another
man’s agonizing life and death, it was after all the least one could require
that he should not engage in begetting children, in producing more lost
souls, for of them there are really enough. By the propagation of the race
the lost are poured out as from a cornucopia. And should then the man
who is saved, as though in thanksgiving for his salvation, also take part
in the propagation of the race, making his contribution to the number
of the lost?11
In the following article, ‘Confirmation and the Wedding’, Kierke-
gaard proceeds to one of his sharpest attacks on Christendom, seem-
ingly interpreting Paul’s recommendation of the single state as a de-
finitive statement of God’s own will and deducing that Christian
marriage is therefore a contradiction in terms and is, in fact, a means
of transforming Christianity ‘into the exact opposite’ of what it is.
The Christianity of the priests ... is directed to cementing families more
and more egoistically together, and to arranging family festivities, beau-
tiful, splendid family festivities, e.g. infant baptism and confirmation,
10. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter 13 (Copenhagen: Gad, 2009),
295 (translation from S. Kierkegaard, tr. W. Lowrie, Attack upon “Christendom”,
tr. W. Lowrie  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 212.
11. Kierkegaard (2009), 296; Kierkegaard (1968), 214.
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which festivities, compared for example with excursions in the Deer
Park and other family frolics, have a peculiar enchantment for the fact
that they are “also” religious. “Woe unto you,” says Christ to the “law-
yers” (the interpreters of Scripture), “for ye took away the keys of
knowledge, ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in
ye hindered. This is the highly respected profession of the priests, a way
of livelihood which prevents men from entering the kingdom of heav-
en.12
This could be read as a radical development of the Augustinian-Ref-
ormation view of original sin, although (obviously) it goes much fur-
ther than the characteristic Lutheran and Calvinist applications of
this doctrine and seems to tend more to a kind of post-Christian po-
sition similar to that of Schopenhauer, where existence or life is as
such a crime and, moreover, a state of continuous and unrelieved suf-
fering in which there is no trace of divine goodness, mercy or love.
Kierkegaard—as opposed to Schopenhauer—still, as that poignant
final journal entry makes clear, does believe that faith can neverthe-
less see that God is love and that all the suffering which the soul en-
dures in this life is itself a trial of love. However, in believing this the
sufferer has no evidence to back up his claim. The world looks, as
Schopenhauer said it was, like a giant torture chamber in which we
can choose only to be tortured or torturers (or presumably, in the
case of Kierkegaardian self-tormentors, both).
It is striking that it is in this very last period of his life that Kierke-
gaard did begin reading Schopenhauer, in May 1854, according to
Niels-Jørgen Cappelørn, who sums up the impact of this reading as
resulting in the appearance or intensification of such emphases as the
necessarily voluntary nature of Christian suffering, the need for suf-
fering as a reduplication of ethical and religious ideals and for asceti-
cism as a consequence of recognizing the wretchedness of life, and a
view of contemporary Protestantism as essentially marked by eudae-
monism. At the same time, he also sees Kierkegaard as noting that a
certain kind of misanthropic pessimism (such as that of Schopenhau-
er himself) can itself be “a new and sophistic form of eudaemonism
or even of a pleasure characterized by melancholy or spleen”, where it
remains merely theoretical and is not accompanied by ascetic renun-
ciation.13
Awareness of an albeit qualified affinity with Schopenhauer is im-
portant because what is going on here in Kierkegaard’s text is some-
12. Kierkegaard (2009), 305; Kierkegaard (1968), 222.
13. See N.-J. Cappelørn, “Historical Introduction: When and Why did Kierkegaard
begin Reading Schopenhauer” in Schopenhauer-Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard Mono-
graph Series, ed. L. Hühn  (Berlin: de Gruyter), forthcoming.
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thing different from a radical application of the doctrine of original
sin. Fully to defend what I am about to say would demand too great
a digression at this point, since it would demand an extensive inter-
pretation of one of Kierkegaards’s more complex pseudonymous
works, The Concept of Anxiety, but I believe that the discussion of
original sin in that work effectively amounts to a systematic demoli-
tion of the Augustinian view.14 It is not only that Kierkegaard—albe-
it in a very different key from a Kantian or Hegelian interpreter—
portrays the biblical account of the Fall as an archetypal narrative of
how each of us becomes what we are rather than as an historical nar-
rative that explains human origins. It is also that the Fall, effected
uniquely in each single human life, is not a result of procreation but
occurs, through anxiety, when freedom succumbs to the vertigo
brought on by its own infinite possibilities and thereupon falls into
finitude. In other words, even though (as he goes on to argue) there
may be a quantitative accumulation of sin from one generation to an-
other, each individual who falls ultimately does so in and through
their own free act or, to be more precise, their failure to enact the
possibilities they have for free self-responsibility. Even if all actual
human beings are fallen, each falls by him- or herself.
But how does this square with the assertion we have heard in The
Instant that a soul is lost simply by virtue of being born and by Kier-
kegaard’s disgust at procreation and family life? The question directs
us to some of the central issues in Kierkegaard’s overall theological
orientation and, I shall suggest, leads us to key aspects both of his
fundamental modernity and of his final lapse into pessimism.
Whilst not ruling out a residual logical tension on this point, I
should like to suggest something like the following. Even when, as in
Barth, the Reformation tradition asserts that the image of God in hu-
man beings was completely annihilated in the Fall so that no ‘point
of contact’ with the divine remains and no earthly ordinances retain
even a trace of God’s original good ordering human life, the total de-
pravity of human beings nevertheless stands within a narrative in
which the memory of paradise lost and the anticipation of paradise
regained are integral and essential moments. Each Christian is, then,
in a sense simultaneously a member of two (arguably even three)
kingdoms, the world’s and God’s. ‘The world’, i.e., the fallen world,
is not the sole horizon within which human life is to be experienced
and interpreted. 
14. In support of this view, see N.-J. Cappelørn, “The Interpretation of Hereditary
Sin in The Concept of Anxiety by Kierkegaard’s Pseudonym Vigilius Haufnien-
sis” in Tijdschrift for Filosofie, 72 (2010), 131-46.
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By way of contrast, Kierkegaard’s rejection of the doctrine of origi-
nal sin is premissed on the assumption that there is only one world.
This is the world that he most eloquently figures in the discourses on
the lilies and the birds, discourses where we see Kierkegaard at his
most world-affirming, insisting on the goodness of creation and the
goodness of life simply as such. The problem with human beings is
not that they have lost all possibility of associating with God and still
less that they have dragged down the rest of creation with them. The
problem with human beings is that they do not take advantage of the
freedom they have, here and now, to be like the lilies and the birds
and to give thanks for their existence as a good and perfect gift of
God. As he writes in one of these discourses: 
So, the fact that you came into the world, that you exist, that ‘today’ you
have got what you need in order to exist, that you came into the world,
that you became a human being, that you can see—just reflect on the
fact that you can see—that you can hear, that you can smell, that you
can taste, that you can feel, that the sun shines on you and shines for
you and, when you grow weary, the moon comes up and the stars are lit;
that winter comes and all of nature changes its garb and takes on a
strange new role—and does so to please you; that spring comes and the
birds return in numerous flocks—and do so to give you joy; that the
green shoots spring up, the woods grow beautiful and present them-
selves as a bride—and do so to give you joy … is this nothing to be joy-
ful about?15 
Here, now, we can turn to God, we can become like the lilies and the
birds, ‘the world’ can become God’s good creation.
Here, we may say (and the motif of absolute dependence in these
discourses might confirm the point), Kierkegaard is operating within
a Schleiermacherian or more generally modern view of the world as a
unitary whole. In relation to the reality of this world, there is no oth-
er world, no lost ‘fantastic’ paradise in the past, and no utopistic pa-
radise in the historical future. Thus the religious challenge is not so
much how to get out of the world but how we are and how we are to
be in it. It is a question of how we see and how we experience the
world and how we choose to live our lives in it. In this situation we
are faced with a very basic choice between world acceptance and
world affirmation on the one hand and world rejection and world de-
nial on the other. Kierkegaard has often been compared with Ni-
15. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter 11 (Copenhagen: Gad 2006),
43-4; (translation from S. Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Writings, tr. G.
Pattison (New York: Harper Perennial 2010), 215-6.
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etzsche, but here the analogy also encompasses a strong disanalogy.
On his own account, Nietzsche’s liberation from Schopenhauerian
pessimism was not so much a matter of acquiring a different under-
standing of the world but of learning to value it differently and of
saying Yes where Schopenhauer, his educator, had said No. Kierke-
gaard’s way, we might say, was in a sense, the opposite—from the
world-affirmation of the lilies and the birds to the world-denial of the
final journal entry and the attack on Christendom. Yet it is not sim-
ple world-denial, and even in the extremity of the final journal entry,
Kierkegaard sees this world and how we are in this world as decisive
with regard to our God-relationship. The suffering we endure, the
disgust we experience in the face of life, is not to be subdued or over-
come but lived to the full in the faith that it is an expression of God’s
love.16 This is not, contra the charge of neo-Gnosticism, a matter of
fleeing the world but a matter of how we are in it. Kierkegaard is
both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and neither. Thus, to come to the
point, when there is only one world and religious existence is a mat-
ter not of holding to a particular set of doctrinal positions but of how
we are in our lives in that one world, then the move from one ex-
treme to another, from world affirmation to world denial or from
world denial to world affirmation, is easier, more rapid, and more de-
pendent on the contingencies of individual life and experience than
when (as in the traditional Christian view) human life is always inter-
preted doctrinally in the perspective of two worlds simultaneously.
Thus, Kierkegaard’s slide into extreme dualism and extreme pessi-
mism is, paradoxically, a result of his anti-Augustinian insistence on
the world of human life and experience as a single world, bounded
only by divine transcendence. If it is a kind of ‘neo-Gnosticism’, its
modernity is at least as important as its echoes of ancient dualisms,
since it has renounced any possibility of there being any other world
than this. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s ‘world’ is essentially the same
world that a Feuerbach, a Marx, or a Nietzsche would have recog-
nized as their own. And if that had not been so, it is hard to imagine
Kierkegaard finding the same response amongst 20th century readers
that he did in fact find, and not least amongst readers who were also
readers of Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche.
16. Perhaps the closest analogy here is neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche but Si-
mone Weil, with particular regard to the interplay of themes of affliction, atten-
tion and the love of God in her work.
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Conclusion
We might seem to have digressed a long way from the question of the
reformation and the deformation of the Church. However, our jour-
ney has, I think, illustrated why Kierkegaard’s attack on the deforma-
tion of the Church in contemporary Danish Lutheranism does not
and cannot be for the sake of reinstating some earlier phase of
Church history, whether that is the monastic heroism of the Middle
Ages or the purity of the apostolic Church. Kierkegaard’s chal-
lenge—implicit already in Philosophical Fragments—is to each indi-
vidual to become a contemporary of Christ outside of or beyond ec-
clesiastical mediation. Whether we see good in all things or are dis-
gusted by all things, that means receiving our lives—as do the lilies
and the birds—direct from God’s hand as a good and perfect gift, a
gift of love. Of course, there is more work to do here in terms of
spelling out how this theme is further developed by Kierkegaard in
terms of the interplay of his theology of creation and his theology of
redemption. However, I hope to have gone some way to showing
how Kierkegaard’s attack on Christendom could appropriately inau-
gurate a movement towards what would come to be known as reli-
gionless or secular Christianity despite what, at first reading, might
look like its extremely dualistic other-worldliness. In this regard we
may say of the pathological dimension of Kierkegaard’s witness
something like what he himself said of the role of the miraculous in
the life of Christ—that it serves to attract attention, but it is not itself
what is to be believed or be attended to. Kierkegaard’s own private
version of the common sickness unto death may arouse our interest,
but it is not itself interesting and nor, crucially, should it finally de-
flect our attention from or give us an excuse for evading the challenge
of his Attack. That challenge is simply whether the idea of ‘Church’
remains relevant to configuring faithful models of Christian existence
in the situation of modernity. 
Putting it like this does not, I think, presuppose that we must agree
with Kierkegaard, but it does mean that we take seriously his view
that the idea and the witness of the Church are, at best, problematic,
uncertain, ambiguous, and endlessly challengeable. No single refor-
mation will ever put it right, but if reformation could be understood
in the sign of Kierkegaardian repetition, we might make a start at liv-
ing in what Ronald Gregor Smith called the unprecedented situation
of Christendom today.
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